Archive for the ‘Corruption’ Category

The only organization he could have been referring to is the Hudson County Democratic Organization.

Sunday, May 9th, 2010

“The organization wants 5% of the total construction cost.”

From the NJ SCI 1971 report

INVESTIGATION INTO THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE

POINT BREEZE AREA OF JERSEY CITY

The Commission in the spring of 1971 received a complaint alleging irregularities in the development of the Point Breeze area of Jersey City. The area is valuable Hudson River waterfront property, and a private developer, the Port Jersey Corporation, was trying to bring to completion its bold and praiseworthy plan for turning the area into a modern containership port with an adjacent industrial park.

An initial investigation by the Commission’s staff not only indicated substance to the irregularities allegation, but also convinced the commissioners that a further probe could bring to public light a clear and informative example of improper, questionable and wasteful procedures in a vital development project dependent for success on the actions ‘Of a municipal government.

Accordingly, the Commission authorized a full field investigation with subsequent private hearings. Public hearings were held October 27 and

Reclamation and development of municipally governed lands throughout the state are of vital concern to the taxpaying public of New Jersey. Without proper safeguards, it is all too possible for improper procedures to be employed with resulting misuse of public and private funds and gross misuse of public trust.

Employment of improper procedures also can inhibit the attraction of private capital and expertise to realize the full potential of valuable lands in the best interest of the state as a whole and of the municipalities in which the lands lie.

We believe the results of this investigation and these hearings point the way toward areas of study and action that could increase the safeguards and close loopholes, all in the interest of spurring proper

and productive reclamation of valuable lands through development and redevelopment projects.

The Commission’s recommendations for possible areas Of study and action at the state level are given in detail in this report. The recommendations are the result Of extensive analysis and thought by the Commission and its staff, and the Commission believes they are worthy ‘Of in-depth consideration.

The Port Jersey Corporation plan for a private development Of Point Breeze as a modern containers-ship port and an associated industrial park is strongly favored by the Commission. All these involved in the investigation were unanimous in finding that plan to be a necessary and excellent development project for the Jersey City area and the state as a whole.

28 in the State Senate Chamber. Chairman McCarthy at that time summarized the intent and results of the Point Breeze probe with these remarks: It’s the Commission’s hope that the clearing of the air by public hearings has aided .in the achievement of completion of that project.

THE DEVELOPER’S DREAM

The availability of the property along the Jersey City waterfront known as Point Breeze was initially brought to’ the attention of Arthur L. Abrams, a Newark attorney who’ represented Construction Aggregates Corporation in New Jersey, by Clinton B. Snyder, a real estate broker from Jersey City.

Mr. Abrams

in turn contacted Ezra Sensibar, president of Construction Aggregate-s Corporation, who’ visited the site and conceived the idea ‘Of a containership port which would surpass any services then being Offered to Ocean going vessels by the city of New York. These three men formed a corporation known as

E.S.C.A. Corporation, later to be named Port Jersey Corporation, for the sole purpose of bidding on the property. On August 1, 1967 at a

public auction, the city accepted a $2,040,000 bid by E.S.C.A. for approximately 223 acres of its waterfront area.

THE COMMISSION OF

$102,000 IS PAID

Statute N.J.S.A. 40 :60–26 states that any municipality may pay a commission of not more than 5 per cent to any real estate broker or other person

However, in this instance a commission of $102,000 was paid by the city to the C. B. Snyder Realty Company, which was controlled by C.

The sum of $51,000 was paid to Mr. Abrams, himself a 25 per cent shareholder in the purchasing corporation. Mr. Abrams, in turn, deposited this amount in the trusteeship account which he kept in the name of the purchasing corporation and from which he paid its bills. In effect then, one half of the commission found its way into the hands of the actual buyer.

The remaining half was distributed by C. B. Snyder to himself and various people in his employ. One such person was Gerard Kelly, who joined Snyder’s company two months after the purchase. Prior to that, he had been the executive director to the Area Development Council and as such, had the prime responsibility for soliciting developers for the Point Breeze area.

Since the public hearings exposing the improperly paid commission, the City of Jersey City has demanded the return of the $102,000 commission from the Snyder firm. The city has said it will go to court, if necessary, to get the money returned to the City’s treasury.

other than the purchaser actually consummating the sale. B. Snyder personally. At this time, Mr. Snyder held a 25 per cent interest in the purchasing entity (E.S.C.A. Corporation). Mr. Snyder distributed this commission in the following manner: ASSURANCES ARE SOUGHT

Immediately after the auction, Ezra Sensibar sought a meeting with John V. Kenny, the Hudson County Democratic leader, to settle from the beginning whether the Port Jersey group would be able to proceed without further demands by city or county officials and with the active cooperation of the municipality. On August 16, 1967, this meeting was held at Bernard Kenny’s office, the architectural firm of Comparetto and Kenny, and included Ezra Sensibar, John V. Kenny and Clinton B. Snyder.

Ezra .Sensibar, being duly sworn, testified as follows:

A. After we were the successful bidder on the property I began to think about the implications of what Mr. Snyder had told me, that the Kislak Organization seemed to .him to be the preferred buyer as far as the city was concerned, and I thought that we ought to find out whether we would be treated fairly, whether we would get reasonable cooperation or whether we would be treated with hostility.

Q.

And what steps did you take to find those things out?

A. I asked Mr. Snyder to arrange a meeting for

me with Mr. J. V. Kenny. Q.

And did he do this?

A. Yes, he did that, and we met on August 16th.

Q.

When you say “we,” who are you referring to?

A. Mr.

J. V. Kenny and I.

Q.

Where was this meeting?

A.

It was in the office of Mr. Bernard Kenny.

Q.

And that would be the architectural firm of Kenny, of

Comparetto? A. That’s right. I should mention that Mr. Snyder was at this meeting.

Q.

And this meeting actually took place in the private office of Mr. Bernard Kenny. Is that right?

A.

It did, yes.

Q.

Can you tell us, to the best of your recollection, what the conversation was at this particular meeting.~

A. At the start of the meeting Mr. Bernard Kenny introduced us and then left the room. I said-I explained to Mr.

,ground of our company, of Construction Aggregates Corporation. I explained to him of interest in this project; that it was not to any great degree in the industrial park portion.

I must say that the property at that time consisted of a garbage dump of about sixty acres surrounded by ten or fifteen acres of marshland. The rest of the two hundred thirty-five acres that we had bid on was land under water covered by’ anywhere from eight to twenty feet of water.

I pointed out to Mr. Kenny that we had very little interest in the shoreward end of it, that we intended to remove the garbage dump and convert the area into an industrial park which would cover something like a hundred acres but that our real interest was in the outward end, in the land that was under water, which we could fill by methods that are historical with our company, which formed the basis of our business, and that we had the dream of converting that into a major container port. I explained to him what that meant, what that should mean to Jersey City and the area in terms of investment and employment.

J. V. Kenny in some detail the back

Q.

And did you say anything else to Mr. Kenny?

A. I told him that we would need many forms of cooperation from the city in order to make this possible. I told him that I had been told by our people that this project had been set up for the Kislak people and that we might be-1 feared we might be regarded as intruders. I said that what we wanted was the ordinary treatment that a businessman and developer is entitled to and I wanted to be sure that we would get it, and I asked him to level with me.

]1 said at that time we had only $50,000 invested in this project and if he felt that we were not going to be treated correctly and given the full cooperation we were entitled to, we would rather leave our $50,000 and go away rather than continue.

Q.

And by “cooperation”, did you also mean that you wanted to be free from all demands that anyone might make upon you as a price for this cooperation?

A. That’s right. I said to him that I wanted to be sure that we would get the cooperation that we were entitled to and that nobody would have his hand out; that we wouldn’t be harassed.

Q.

And what was Mr. Kenny’s reply?

A. Mr. Kenny said that as far as Kislak was concerned they owed him nothing, that they had done enough for him already. He said that the explanation that I made about our intentions in the project was the best thing he had heard, the first spark of development on the waterfront and that he thought that we were doing a great deal more for Jersey City than they could do for us. He said that he would guarantee every form of cooperation

by the city, and they wanted us there. And he said that if any son-of-a-bitch asked for money, to come to him and we would take care of him.

THE PROJECT NEEDED TAX ABATEMENT

The marine nature of the development placed it directly in Competition with the Port of New York Authority, an agency enjoying a substantial tax advantage. This together with the soaring .Jersey City tax rate made Some tax reduction a necessity.

Mr. Sensibar testified:

Q.

Was it also apparent at. this. time that you needed the city’s help ·in the tax structure of the project itself?

A. Yes, because this project, the. marine end of this project in order to be successful had

to compete with the Port Authority. It was extremely essential

to’ the project to have favorable tax treatment. Q.

Now, what do you mean, competition with the Port Authority? Could you explain to the Commission?

A. Yes. The Port of New York Authority operation particularly in Newark and in Elizabeth is, of course, the main marine terminal in the port. They have two advantages over any private developer. The first is that they pay no taxes and in lieu of taxes pay a nominal amount. The second is that they can· finance themselves with tax-exempt securities, which means that even today they can borrow money at five and a half or six per cent, whereas we ‘,re paying ten and a half per cent for our money.

Now, these two advantages make it extremely difficult for any private operator

to develop port facilities, and the only chance that a private operator has is to have the advantages offered· by the Fox-Lance treatment in respect to future taxes. Now this is not on the land, but on the buildings, ‘on the improvements that are put on the land.

Q.

Were you aware of the high tax rate which Jersey City had prior to your purchasing the property?

A. Was I aware of it

Q.

Yes.

A. No, sir.

Q.

This was a stumbling block, then, that you bec.ame aware of after,’ you had purchased the property?

A. That is correct. A stable tax rate was also necessary to attract shipping clients who had

vo project their own charges over a number of years. Mr. Sensibar further testified: Q.

Was one of your problems also trying to attract clients into your project?

A. Yes, indeed. And, of course, the problem of the taxes always came up. Our rental offers or net offers, in other words, the client who rents the property has to pay rental to us and he has to pay the taxes. And, so’, of Course a basic consideration in making these deals and attracting any client is his assurance of what the tax rate will be in the future.

PRESSURE FOR A PAYOFF

In the spring of 1968 the Port Jersey Corporation began to experience great difficulties in securing the cooperation of the municipality regarding the providing of access roads, sewage and water connections and ‘other sundry items. In addition, these private developers were confronted with a snarl of red tape on the municipal, state and federal levels when they attempted to solve the many title problems which these coastal lands raised. On November 21, 1968 the closing of title was finally consummated, and cleaning, filling and construction was commenced in January of 1969.

Between January and February of 1969, Mr. Sensibar received constant complaints from Port Jersey’s men on the site that the city was doing nothing towards those items of cooperation already agreed upon. In February of 1969, at a meeting in the Downtown Club of Newark, Clinton Snyder and Arthur Abrams heard their architect, Bernard Kenny, deliver a message that, “the organization wants

Mr. Abrams, being duly sworn, testified as follows:

Ezra Sensibar, when told about the demand, requested Bernard Kenny to arrange a meeting with Thomas Flaherty, President of the Jersey City Council, at Sensibar’s hotel room in New York City. Mr. Sensibar testified:

5% of the total construction cost.” Q.

And at this time, Mr. Abrams, what was the anticipated cost of construction of the project, approximately?

A. Fifty, a hundred million dollars.

Q.

Over a hundred million dollars, wasn’t it, sir?

A. Well, at that time I’m not so sure.

I mean, now it looks big.

Q.

Well, did Mr. Kenny indicate to you who composed the organization; on whose behalf was he speaking?

A. No, he did not.

Q.

Well, did you ask him?

A.

I did not.

Q.

Did you ask him how it would be paid over?

A. He said it should be paid in cash. That’s what he said.

Q.

Did he suggest manners through which you could raise this type of cash or did he go into detail? No.

Q.

Did he say what was going to be done with the money? No.

Q.

Did he say that it could be turned over to him. personally for distribution to the, quote, organization, unquote?

A. No,

I don’t recall that. I don’t recall that.

Q.

You mean he simply said to you that” we want· five per cent”?

A. He said a lot of things. He didn’t say “we;” . he didn’t say “we.” He didn’t include himself. He

said, “the organization.”

Q.

He left himself out? Yes.

Q.

Do you know which organization he was referring to?

A. The only organization he could have been referring to is the Hudson County Democratic Organization. I don’t think I had to ask him any details about what he meant, and he didn’t think it was necessary to tell me.

Q.

Well, as a result of this meeting-~well,

incidentally, Mr. Abrams, did he indicate to you what, if anything would happen if this percentage. was not met? A. No, he didn’t threaten. He just indicated that difficulties-we would experience difficulties. He said that we might–if we didn’t want to pay it, that they would try to, and he would help complete the project independently, but it would be difficult.

Q.

after you received the complaints from your people on the job site did you also have a conversation in which Mr. Snyder told you that Bernie Kenny had indicated that you had better see someone? A. Yes. Mr. Snyder told me that he and Mr. Abrams had met with Mr. Kenny, Bernard Kenny, and they discussed this problem of non-cooperation at city hall and that Mr. Kenny said that it was essential that I should meet with Tom Flaherty.

Q.

Now, do you recall Mr. Snyder or MI”. Abrams telling You, where they had met with Mr. Bernard Kenny and discussed this?

A.

No, I do not.

Q.

All right. Did you make arrangements to meet with Mr. Flaherty?

A. Yes. I asked Mr. Bernard Kenny to

arrange a meeting with Mr. Flaherty.

Q.

Why did you ask Bernard Kenny to perform this?

A. Well, he was the local man in Jersey City and knew everybody.

Q.

Was

that one of the reasons that you hired him, that he had political contacts in Jersey City? A. Yes, one of our considerations in hiring his :firm was that they were well regarded, well connected locally.

Q.

Did Mr. Bernard Kenny manage to set up a meeting between you and Mr. Flaherty?

A. Yes. He set up a meeting which was held in my hotel room in New York and attended by Mr. Flaherty and Mr. Snyder.

Q.

Was Mr. Bernard Kenny there, also?

A. Sir1

Q.

Was Mr. Bernard Kenny there, also?

A. He was not.

Q.

Can we fix a time for this meeting with Mr. Flaherty?

A. Early February, I would say, middle February.

Q.

Of .969?

A. Yes, sir. Excuse me. Now, I think it might have been the end of January.

It was right up close to the 1st of February.

Q.

Will you tell the Commission as nearly as you can recollect how the conversation went at this particular meeting?

A. I told Mr. Flaherty that I was getting these complaints from our people about lack of cooperation. I told him of my original discussion with Mr. J. V. Kenny and the promise of cooperation.

Mr. Flaherty said, yes, he knew about that, but that the organization needed money and he thought that we should contribute three per cent of the value of our construction work.

Sensibar then asked Bernard Kenny to arrange for a second meeting with John V. Kenny to discuss Flaherty’s demand. Mr. Sensibar testified:

A. I continued, of course, to receive complaints from our people, and when I went back to Chicago and thought about this thing, the more I thought about it the more angry I became.

Q ..

Were you aware that previous to this Mr. Bernard Kenny had met with Mr. Abrams and Mr. Snyder in N e1va”k in the Downtown Club and there had told Mr. Abrams and Mr. Snyder that the organization was requesting five per cent of your total construction cost?

A. I was not aware of it.

Q.

As far as you can recollect, then, when Mr. Flaherty met with you”, in New York he was “eq1testing three per cent of Yo1tr total project?

A. That’s correct.

Q.

And what did you do when you were faced with this particular demand?

A. I told him that it was completely and utterly out of the question; that Mr.

He said it was-that he knew about that, but it was nevertheless necessary; and that he was the man appointed to collect funds for the organization; they had

I had told him that nevertheless we couldn’t pay it, and the meeting broke up on that note.

Kenny had promised us cooperation, promised us that we would be free of harassment; and that I intended to proceed on that basis. 1m expensive political campaign underway; they needed money; they had to look to the larger people like ourselves to make the contributions and that he couldn’t take no for an answer.

Q.

And what did you”, do?

A. I thought then that the thing to do was to go back to

J. V. Kenny, and I asked Mr. Bernie Kenny to set up an .appointment for me with Mr. Kenny. Q.

And did he set 11p an appointment for you with Mr. John V. Kenny?

A. Yes, he did, and I met with him a couple of weeks or so later.

Q.

Where did this meeting take place?

A. In Mr. Bernard Kenny’s office.

Q.

This would be, then, someti1ne in-

A. Early February, middle of February.

Q.

Of 1969?

A. Yes, sir.

Q.

Would you tell the Commission, as nearly as you can recollect, the conversation that took place at this particular meeting with Mr. John V. Kenny?

A. I told him of Mr, Flaherty’s demand. I reminded him of our initial discussion.

Mr.

J. V. Kenny said that he remembered it; he remembered our initial discussion, that he would stand by it. He said nevertheless that they did have an expensive campaign; that Mr. Flaherty was the man who was delegated to raise funds for the campaign, and that it would be appreciated if we would make a campaign contribution.

Q.

With the project still stalled by municipal delay and daily costs mounting, Sensibar asked Bernard Kenny to arrange another meeting with Thomas Flaherty on April 16, 1969, Mr, Sensibar testified:

A. By sometime in early April Mr. Snyder and Mr. Abrams and Mr. Kenny, Bernie Kenny, said that they were so stymied at city hall that they thought it was

necessary that I should have another meeting-with

Mr. Flaherty.

What did you say in reply to this, if anything?

A. I don’t recall that I made any answer at all. I think that the meeting ended on

that note.

Q.

N010, was there any change in your position as regards to your financial commitment into the project at this time?

A. By this time we had over $3,000,000 invested in this project and we were spending money every day on a grand scale.

Q.

Now, with your knowledge that your men on the scene were running into these drawbacks did yon, in fact, arrange for another meeting with Mr. Flaherty?

A. Yes,

I had another meeting-with him on April 16th.

Q.

And who arranged for that meeting?

A. Mr. Bernie Kenny.

Q.

Where did the meeting take place?

A. To the best of my recollection it was in his office.

Q.

And who was at that meeting besides Yourself and Mr. Flaherty?

A. No one else.

Q.

This time Mr. Snyder did not accompany yon?

A, No one accompanied me to that meeting’.

Q.

Would you tell the Commission, to the best of your recollection, what the conversation was at that meeting?

A. I complained to Mr. Flaherty that the matters were not moving-in city hall and he brought up again the matter of the campaign contribution. The campaign was then drawing to an end. This was April. I think the election was in May, or to be in May. He said that he particularly needed $140,000 to finance the balance of the campaign; that he had to

” I turned the conversation away from the question of any basis and tried to put in on a platform

go to a few large contributors to get the money. He said that Mr. Kenny had talked with him, Mr. J. V. Kenny had talked with him; that he was-he realized that the proposal that he had made to me before was unrealistic; that he was willing-to’ come down to a basis of one per cent of our building construction as a contribution. Of what he was was the minimum he needed right now. ‘We did a little talking about it. I suggested a campaign Contribution of $10,000. He said it was not enough and after considerable discussion raised it to $20,000. Q.

This as far as the meeting went, then, was probably merely

A. I don’t know his state of mind. I know my state of mind; that we had the shotgun to our heads at that time. We couldn’t go forward with this project. By this time we had 4 or $5,000,000 into it and I knew it would all go down the drain if we didn’t somehow make peace and get quick cooperation from city hall. I was disposed to make a campaig11 contribution of $20,000 to get that peace.

Q.

Now, did you dismiss with Mr. Flaherty how the money was to be paid?

A. Yes. I asked him what the mechanism was, to whom we should make out the check, and he said that in Hudson County you don’t make out checks. This would have to be paid in cash.

Q.

How did you arrange to generate this $20,000 in

cash

A. I had Mr. Abrams on behalf of Port Jersey send me a check for $20,000, which I had cashed in Chicago.

Q.

in Chicago?

Now, I show you what has been previously marked as Exhibit C-l-C-4, I’rn sorry, and I ask you if that is the check which Mr. Abrams did send to you

A.

It is; it is.

Q.

And did you have someone cash this check at a bank in Chicago and receive the currency?

A. I did.

Q.

Now, at every point in your discussions either with Mr. Kenny or with Mr. Flaherty were you advising your two partners, Mr. Abrams and Mr. Snyder, of what was taking place?

A. Yes. Shortly after my meeting with Mr. Flaherty on the 19th I consulted with Mr. Snyder and Mr. Abrams. They both said that it was unrealistic to expect that we could do as much construction. work, as much business as we were doing in Hudson County without acceding to a shakedown of some kind. They thought that $20,000 in the circumstances might be nominal and they urged that I should arrange for us to pay it.

Q.

Did these men warn you prior to your coming into this project in New Jersey that it would be unr

ealistic for you to complete construction withour having to pay something to someone? A. They did not. We didn’t discuss that subject.

Mr. Clinton

Q.

Now, after you received the $20,000 from Mr. Abrams in the form of this check and Y01′ cashed it on, I believe it was, April 23rcl-let me get that check -on April 23rd, 1969

how soon thereafter did you arrange to get the money in Mr. Flaherty’s hands? A. Within a few days after that at a meeting which we had in New York at one of the shipping lines in an effort to attract them to Port Jersey I met Mr. Snyder and handed him the $20,000 to deliver to Mr. Flaherty.

Q.

Did you give the $20,000 to MI’. Snyder in any sad of container or package, or was it just in cash?

A.

It was in an envelope in cash.

Q.

Did you instruct Mr. Snyder what to do with it or did he already know?

A. Well, he already knew, and I handed him the money and said, “This is the money for Flaherty,”

Q.

Do you know–1AJell, as for as you know, then, Mr. Snyder delivered that money to Mr. Flaherty?

A. I certainly believe he did.

B. Snyder was called to testify. However, upon being warned of his rights he gave the following response:

Q.

Mr. Snyder, did you participate in any payoff to any city official in Jersey City or Hudson County?

(Whereupon, the witness confers with counsel.)

A. I refuse to answer on the grounds that it might incriminate me.

WAS MONEY

PAID FOR TAX ABATEMENT? The testimony raised the question of whether money was paid for the granting of tax relief in addition to the $20,000 which Mr. Sensibar and Mr. Abrams said they paid for municipal “cooperation” in other areas. Mr. Edward Light, Sr., a former employee of

Mr. Edward Patterson, a witness of this conversation, also testified as to what he remembered was said:

M. Gerard Kelly denied making the statement at all:

C. B. Snyder Realty Company, testified that he participated in a conversation with Mr. Edward Patterson and M. Gerard Kelly regarding Port Jersey development:

Q.

Mr. Light, I

direct your attention to the month of August, 1969, and I ask you, sir, where were you employed at that time? A. At C. B. Snyder Realty in Jersey City.

Q.

And in what capacity were you employed?

A. As an industrial representative.

Q.

At that time, sir, was there also one M. Gerard Kelly employed on the premises of C.

B. Snyder? A. Yes.

Q.

And what were his responsibilities?

A. Gerry was responsible for the development of the Port Jersey facility as an industrial complex.

Q.

Were Y01t, sir, at this time also endeavoring to attract clients to the Port Jersey project?

A. Of course.

Q.

Were you having difficulties doing this?

A. Yes, for the reason that the development was not going forward as it properly should.

Q.

Well, at any time, sir, during the month of August, 1969,

did you go to Mr. Kelly and discuss this with him? A. Well, I didn’t personally. Together with Mr. Patterson, we interviewed Gerry Kelly after a Monday morning meeting with regard to what we could expect as far as the advancement of the development could be expected, and at that time he told us that it looked like a downhill pull from there on for the reason that the corporation had been able to secure a tax abatement of some $400,000.

It had cost $50,000 for the securing of the abatement, but he said it was well worth the Investment because now the building could go forward and all of the rest of the development could move.

Q.

Did he explain to Y01, what he meant by the payment of $50,000?

A. No, not exactly, just that $50,000 it had cost to get the abatement of the tax.

Q.

Mr. Paterson, were you during the month of August, 1969,

employed by the C. B. Snydel’ Organization Yes. Q.

And in what capacity, sir?

A. In the industrial department. I was a supervisor.

Q.

And you have this morning, sir, heard the testimony of M. Gerard Kelly, is that correct, sir’?

A. I have.

Q.

And have you also heard the testimony of Mr.. Edward Light?

A. I have.

Q.

Is Mr. Edward Light’s version of what transpired at this meeting an accurate representation of the conversation?

A. Yes, it is.

Q.

Is there anything you wish to add to it?

A. No, I think that was it in totality.

Q.

Mr. Kelly, did you ever’ make a statement referring to Port Jersey that it “cost us $50,000, for tax abatement, but it was well worth it”?

A. I don’t believe I ever said that statement.

THE BLIGHTED MIRACLE

When the Port Jersey group became the successful bidder on August 1, 1967, the mayor of Jersey City hailed their development idea as a “miracle” for the Jersey City waterfront. Soon thereafter this same group began to press the city for a tax abatement as a prerequisite to successful development. The law required that before property could be granted Fox-Lance treatment, it must be declared blighted and a development plan be formulated for its use.

Not all property can be blighted-only that land which satisfies one of five statutory conditions can be so designated. To this end the City planning board commissioned Alvin E. Gershen Associates to make a blight survey of the entire waterfront area. They recommended to the Planning Board that this entire area be declared blighted. After a public hearing, the Planning Board made the same recommendation to the City Council. The Council, however, designated only the property owned by the Port Jersey Corporation and an area belonging to the federal government known as Caven Point.

Mr. Alvin Gershen and his employee, Elwood Jarmer, were both duly sworn and testified as follows:

Q.

And one of the accounts that you had on a consultant basis was the Jersey City account. Is that correct?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Yes, sir.

Q.

You! were a consultant to them?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Our firm was, yes, sir.

Q.

And did you also aid Jersey City by sitting on what is

known as the Mayor’s Development Council? A. (By Mr. Gershen) I did, sir.

Q.

Was that part of your consulting duties?

A. (By Mr. Gershen)

It was.

Q.

In addition to that, were you commissioned by the city council to make a blight survey of the area known as the Jersey City waterfront?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) We were.

Q.

Did you make stl.ch a survey, or did your firm make such a survey in conjunction with the Jersey City Planning Board

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Our firm did.

Q.

And who actually did the field work?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Mr. Jarmer did the field work and wrote the report.

Q.

I show you what has been marked previously as C-6 for identification, which is

the Waterfront St1tdy Blight Report. A. (By Mr. Gershen) Yes, sir.

Q.

Is that the blight report which you submitted in July of 1970 to the Jersey City Planning Board?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Yes, sir, to the division of planning.

*

* Q.

Did you know why you were asked to make such a survey?

A. (By Mr. Jarmer) To my knowledge the reason for the survey was to do a comprehensive study of the entire waterfront to determine if it were blighted and then to come up with a plan for the entire waterfront.

Q.

Well, do you know why Jersey City was interested at this point in determining whether this waterfront area was blighted?

A. (By Mr. Jarmer) The reason, to my knowledge, was to have a comprehensive development of the waterfront.

Q.

All right. If I may get back to Mr. Gershen. Mr. Gershen, did you learn later on that the Jersey City V01bncil had declared a portion of the waterfront area a blighted or renewal area?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Yes, I did.

Q.

And I believe this particular resolution or decision was made on September 15th, 1970. Is that correct?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) I would take that to be correct. I don’t have that information with me, but it would be about then.

Q.

Now, in your opinion as a planner is it in the best interests of the City of Jersey City in developing the property as a whole, in developing the waterfront as a whole, that they should single out only a small portion of that particular property and designate it as a blighted area? It is not. That’s in my judgment as a planner.

Q.

Now, is it possible in your judgment to designate only the area in blue which was owned by the Port Jersey Corporation under construction at that time as a blighted area?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Sir, I’m unclear as to precisely what your question is:

If you are saying would we recommend that the blue area at the bottom of that map, if that were the only area to be presented for a blight determination, would we recommend that it be blighted? .

Q.

Yes.

A. (By Mr. Gershen) At the time on the calendar it was blighted, the answer is no.

Q.

Now, Mr. Gershen, in your experience as a Planner have you

had occasion to counsel other m1tnicipalities in a law known as the Fox-Lance Law or the tax abatement statute? A. (By Mr. Gershen) Yes, sir.

Q.

This particular statute, can you tell the Commission briefly what sort of benefit it gives to a developer who comes in and starts to redevelop an area?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) In general terms, under the Urban Renewal Corporations and Association Law, commonly referred to as Fox-Lance after two state senators, namely two state senators, permits a municipality to forgive a specific urban renewal corporation from the payment of taxes for a period of time, generally fifteen years, and to pay in lieu of taxes a percentage of either income or value to the municipality. This percentage obviously is somewhat less than what would be paid had full taxes been required.

Q.

Now, prior to such treatment it’s necessary that the municipality blight the area it’s dealing with. Is that correct?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) In our judgment that’s one of the conditions that must prevail, that the area be blighted.

Q.

Well, that

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Yes. I say, one of the statutories. ‘There are others, we feel.

Q.

Are there any others that must be met before you can designate an area as an area that should receive Fox-Lance treatment.?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) In our professional judgment, what’s required

in addition to the ‘blighting’ of an area is the adoption of an urban renewal plan in accordance, as the statute says, in accordance with the procedures specified in Section 17 (b) of Chapter 306 of the Laws of ’49. That citation is the :Redevelopment Agencies Law of 1949.

Q.

Well, in other words, what you are telling us is that an additional statutory requirement’ be/ore an area may receive tax abatement is that there be a plan for the development 0/ that area that qualified?

A. (By Mr. Gershen)

An additional qualification for the use of the Urban Renewal Corporations Act, because there are other acts under the statute, under our New Jersey statutes, which provide for tax abatement. Bo under this statute there is a requirement that there is blight, and in our judgment there is a requirement in addition to that that the conditions as recited in 40:550-17(b), which is the Redevelopment Agencies Law, must be present since 40 :55C-46 of the Fox-Lance Law requires it. I don’t mean to get that technical.

Q.

Let me ask. in your opinion do you feel that the statute requires that there be a redevelopment plan for an area before Fox-Lance may be applied to the

area?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) Yes, sir.

Q.

Do you know whether there was a redevelopment plan for the area known as port Jersey before FoxLance was applied to it?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) I do not know the answer to that. I know that we prepared, our firm prepared, a redevelopment or a land-use plan for the total area you see on that map.

Q.

When was that submitted to the City of Jersey City?

A. (By Mr. Gershen) It’s submitted in a report dated July, 1971, and that was submitted to the division of planning.

MR.

SAPIENZA: :Mr. Chairman, for the record, the city entered into a financial agreement with the Harbor Renewal Corporation on December 7, 1970, granting-that corporation Fox-Lance treatment.

Q.

Now, 1I1r. Gershen, let me ask you’ this: In your opinion havinp worked with Fox-Lance in other municipalities, is it possible to prant Fox-Lance treatment to an area 1uhich is under construction where construction has been commenced and a phase of it completed?

LABOR COOPERATION FOR A PRICE

Testimony revealed that the president of the International Longshoremen’s Association local for the Jersey City area was paid $3860 to “reimburse him for expenses” incurred on behalf of the Port Jersey Corporation.

Mr. Arthur Abrams testified:

Q. C-5 for identification is a check drawn on the trust account of Arthur Lawrence Abrams under date

of July 11, 1968,

in the amount of $3860, payable to Frank Murray. I show you that check, sir, and ask you whether you issued that. A. Yes.

Q.

Who, Mr. Abrams, is Frank Murray? He was then, and I don’t know whether he still is, he was then president of the Jersey City local of the ILA.

Q.

The Longshoremen’s local? That’s right.

Q.

For what purpose did you issue this check to Mr. Murray?

A. To reimburse him for expenses that he claimed he had on our behalf.

Q.

At whose direction did you issue that check to him? Mr. Sensibar.

Q.

Did you ever see a voucher submitted by Mr. Murray to explain what expenses he had incurred? No, there was no voucher submitted.

Q.

No voucher was submitted. Did You ever ask Mr. Murray what he did? No.

Q.

Did you ever ask Mr. Sensibar what he did for you, for the money?

A. Oh, Mr. Murray. The way you phrased the question, did

I ask ,him. Mr. Murray had been extremely helpful to us in terms of introducing us to potential shipping people. He had done a great deal of leg work on our behalf trying to interest people, not for unselfish reasons but for the fact that he wanted shipping companies to come to Jersey City.

Q.

Well, have You obtained any clients at all as a result at introductions you received through Frank Murray? No. Not through any brokers, either, so we had a lot

Q.

So he really didn’t do that much for you!?

A. Well, $3,800

worth, I don’t know. But he did. He did work for us. He did. He helped. Q.

Well, did he mail you a bill?

A. No.

Q.

Well, how did you arrive at the thirty-eight hundred-sixty-dollar figure?

A. That was his. That was what he asked for.

Q.

He said, “Give me $3,860″?

A. Exactly.

Q.

Well, did he offer to do anything for Port Jersey with regard to potential labor problems in exchange for that?

A. Yes. He indicated that it was related to a number of gangs that would potentially be required at Port Jersey and that he needed that sum to pay some expenses in connection with allocating these gangs to Port Jersey.

Q.

In other words, he had to pay expenses to allocating some of these gangs to Port Jersey?

A. That was what he said.

Q.

You are still active in the Port Jersey operation, aren’t you, sir?

A. Oh, yes.

Q.

And this check is dated July 11, 1968.

Today do you have an ILA local working Or! Y01,r project? A. I don’t know. I just don’t know. Maybe one of the warehouses has ILA labor. I don’t know. We don’t have any.

Q.

They are, in fact, Teamsters working in the 1varehouses, aren’t they?

A. I know they’re Teamsters. They may be ILA people, too.

Q.

You don’t know?

A. No, I don’t know. I don’t have anything to do with that. That’s tenants. We have no shipping facility in operation yet.

SUMMARY OF THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Possible formation, after appropriate study, of a new or revised unit of state government to plan and coordinate the development of valuable lands throughout the state and

2. The statutes should be changed

3. The Fax-Lance tax abatement statute and its effects in the past 10 years should be thoroughly studied and analyzed with the aim of making that statute a more effective tool for stopping urban decline.

4. The statute on brokerage fees paid far sales of public lands should be amended to bar more effectively any payment of those fees to purchasers of the land.

5. The state should have up-to-date and more effective criminal statutes on bribery and corruption.

to assist private developers in improving and realizing the full potential of those lands.

to’ require formulation of a municipal redevelopment plan in time for that plan to be adopted simultaneously with a declaration of blight. THE COMMISSION’S RECOMMENDATIONS IN DETAIL

1. Possible formation, after appropriate study, of a new or

revised unit of state government to plan and coordinate the development of val1wble lands throughout the state and to assist private developers in realizing the full potential of those lands.

to’ creation of any new or revised unit of state government, an exhaustive study should first be made of the various federal, state, county and local functions now pertaining to the development and redevelopment of lands, particularly urban lands. That study should pinpoint exactly what an enlarged state role can accomplish most effectively and efficiently, while still reserving to the municipalities the power to’ shape their own destinies. B.

Municipalities still would be empowered to make their own blight declarations. But, the investigation and findings by any proposed state office would, in effect, do much of the homework for the municipalities in determining the propriety and usefulness of blighted areas.

“What is envisioned by the Commission is a degree of statewide coordination of urban blight land redevelopment, with municipalities working in harmony rather than competition with the state which should have, at least, the power to review local decisions on development plans and on blighting.

C. Any proposed new state unit should be under statutory direction to be of all possible assistance to developers.

• Maintain an adequate and expert staff that will discuss freely and fully with a developer all problems and procedures involved in developing a certain area.

• ‘Find and execute, in cooperation with the developer, all possible ways of cutting red tape and delays in acquiring and getting clear title to lands. The proposed new office could be helpful in straightening out riparian land problems.

• In keeping a constant inventory of lands, the office should compile full data on municipal tax rates and any other fiscal factors affecting those lands as a way of aiding the developer in estimating the true costs that will be encountered in a project.

• Any proposed new office should make and maintain channels of communication with all federal, state, county and municipal agencies that could be involved in development and redevelopment projects so that a developer can be directed to specific agencies and people within those agencies.

• The office should keep a thorough and up-to-date file on all developers who might be interested in various types and aspects of development and redevelopment projects so that combinations or marriages of various developer interests and capabilities can be accomplished.

The Commission found that the Port Jersey Corporation was primarily interested in filling in a waterfront area and constructing a containership terminal. The corporation would have liked to enter the project jointly with another developer expert in industrial park projects. Port Jersey, however, didn’t find a partner and had to undertake on its own both the containership terminal and the adjacent industrial park project.

To determine which lands or areas should be declared blighted under the Blighted Areas Act to pave the way for redevelopment projects. . It is suggested the office could take the following steps as a minimum:

2. The statues should be changed to require formulation of a municipal redevelopment plan in time for that plan to be adopted simultaneously with a declaration of blight.

The existing statutory requirement is that a municipal redevelopment plan must be formed prior to granting Fox-Lance tax abatement to a project but not before the declaration of blight which paves the way for municipal redevelopment.

Logic and proper planning procedures would dictate that a municipal redevelopment plan should be carefully thought out and formulated before decisions are made on blighting areas. In the Port Jersey project, Jersey City never did formulate and adopt a redevelopment plan for its waterfront property until after the sale of its property, the declaration that a portion of it was blighted, and some tax relief was granted. Although the city planning board recommended blighting the entire waterfront area, the city council voted to blight only the Port Jersey area and the adjacent Caven Point area. That procedure was, to say the least, chaotic and, to say the most, possibly improper.

We urge the statutes he amended so that the Blighted Areas Act requires adoption of a municipal redevelopment plan contemporaneously with a declaration of blight and as a precedent to use of municipal power in dealing with a blighted area.

The redevelopment plan should, by statutory direction, be formed by the municipal planning· board. In cases where a municipality does not have that type of board, the plan could be formed by any new proposed State government unit.

3. The Fox-Lance tax abatement statute and its effects in the past

10 years should be thoroughly studied and analyzed with the aim of making that statute a more effective tool for stopping urban decline.

The Fox-Lance law is a method for attracting private capital to develop an area by assuring the private developer a stable tax base for 20 years from the signing of a development agreement or 15 years from completion of

During that time, the developer pays taxes on land but not on improvements on the land. In lieu of no tax on improvements, the developer pays

The Commission suggests any study of the Fox-Lance statute should delve into the questions ·of whether to continue to leave room to negotiate the abatement rate up to certain levels or whether a shift to more fixed, non-negotiable rate might be in order.

One principal problem raised by granting Fox-Lance abatement on too grand a scale is that the municipality involved in an effort to attract new industry indirectly places a higher tax burden ‘On other properties, and the higher taxes, in turn, tend to drive Existing industrial ratables and homeowners from the city.

The decision to grant tax abatement and realize less than full revenue on a project is rightfully placed with the mayor and governing body of a municipality because they are responsible for imposing taxes and balancing the municipal budget.

However, the Omission suggests as worthy ‘Of close study a suggestion that the Fox-Lance statute should be altered to permit any proposed new state government unit to grant property tax abatement to private developers but with a companion requirement that the state reimburse a municipality for the full difference between what a municipality would have gotten by fully taxing a project and what it actually got under state grant of tax abatement.

The Commission notes the possibility that the Fox-Lance law is unnecessarily confining and inflexible in not permitting tax abatement to be app1ied retroactively to existing improved properties. A city might want to keep valuable industry within its borders by giving some sort of tax break. However, under the present statute, tax abatement can be applied only to new construction projects.

the~ contract, whichever comes first.

up to two per cent of the total project cost or up to 15 per cent of the rents paid by users of the improvements. 4. The statute on brokerage fees paid for sales of public. lands should be amended to bal’ more effectively any payment of those fees to purchasers on the land.

The Commission’s hearings on the Port Jersey project showed that half of a $102,000 brokerage fee paid by Jersey City wound up in the coffers of the Port Jersey Corporation. The other half went to a real estate firm, the head of which was a principal in the Port Jersey Corporation.

Obviously, if purchasers wind up getting all or part of the brokerage fees paid by a municipality, they are in effect getting a refund that lowers the amount they had to pay to acquire public lands.

The last paragraph of the statute

In all sales made pursuant to paragraphs (a) (c) or

(d) of this section the governing body of any municipality

(N.J.S.A. 40:60-26) now reads in part: may pay a commission to any real estate broker or other person other than the purchaser actually consummating such sale, but such commission shall not be more than 5% of the sale price. The statute does not define the term “purchaser” nor does it require that the decision to pay a commission be included in the conditions publicly advertised nor in the contract for sale. The commission recommends the following changes in the statute:

• The term purchaser should be defined as including any person, corporation or other business entity which owns or controls directly

• Before any commission may be paid, the proposed payment must be included in the conditions of sale publicly advertised, and the recipient must file an affidavit ‘with the governing body stating that he is not a purchaser within the terms of the statutes.

01′ indirectly more than 10 per cent of the purchasing entity.

5. The State should have up-to-date and more effective criminal statutes on bribery and corruption,

The Law Revision Commission, in revising the state’s entire criminal code, has come up with excellent, modern proposals for new bribery and corruption statutes. We heartily endorse that work of that Commission and urge that our patchwork mixture of outmoded statutes intermingled with common law be replaced with a truly effective and integrated language as recommended by the Commission.

With new and modern statutes, the Commission believes the pace and success of law enforcement in the bribery and corruption field will increase markedly.

Certainly, no stone, statutory or otherwise, Should be left unturned

in trying to prevent re-occurrences Of the shocking nature revealed at the Commission’s hearings on the Port Jersey development. The Port Jersey Corploration was pressured into making an imprlOper$20,OOO cash payment to a Jersey City Official as the price of having the city cooperation so vital to the success of the project .

 

The Commission concluded from its investigation and hearings on the Port Jersey project that strong consideration should be given to the state’s playing a larger and more influential role in the development of lands so valuable to the economic well-being of New Jersey as a whole.

However, the Commission believes that prior

The Commission notes that after its public hearings last October and before issuance of this annual report, Governor Cahill in his 1972 Annual Message to the Legislature called for a far-reaching program of state, county and municipal} cooperation to revitalize the Lower Hudson Waterfront.

The governor’s recommendations included creation of a special interdepartmental committee to prepare a plan for development of the waterfront and to recommend needed revisions of municipal land use regulations, plus legislation to create a multi-purpose agency to encourage private investment in the area.

The Commission believes the record of its hearings on the Port Jersey project, as detailed in sworn testimony in previous pages of this report, offers a concrete and specific instance of the need for the greater coordination and planning that the Commission now joins the Governor in advocating. Obviously the Port Jersey plan represents a development project with a function and impact that go far beyond the municipal boundaries in which the project lies.

The hearings on the Port Jersey project also demonstrated how private developers can be faced with a bewildering, frustrating and all too costly process of having to deal with an array of federal, state and local agencies from the time of looking for available land to completion of a project. The Port Jersey corporation had to negotiate with no less than 37 federal, state and local agencies. The matter of getting a riparian grant from the state took three years. Those facts certainly indicate the usefulness of some type of single governmental unit of statewide stature and expertise to provide information and otherwise help to smooth the path for developers of similarly important land through the complex web of making a development dream become a reality.

The Commission urges that once appropriate study has determined the best exact nature of any new or revised unit of state government, that unit be given responsibilities and powers in the following areas:

A. To survey and keep an up-to-date statewide inventory of all lands available and suitable for various kinds ·of development and redevelopment projects.

A.

A.

A.

A.

A.

A.

A. (By Mr. Gershen) In my judgment, no.

is one of the statutory provisions? A. (By Mr. Gershen)

A.

a down payment on what Mr. Flaherty expected to take from you; would that be correct? ” … A.

A.

A.

 

John V. Kenny: I wish that Stern was here, so I could spit in his eye.

Saturday, May 1st, 2010

Memoirs of Hudson County

Originally appeared in Tiger In The Court
By Paul Hoffman

As election day approached, it was clear that the net was closing on Kenny and his Hudson County cabal. But the Little Guy continued to spout defiance. “I wish that Stern was here,” he said in early October, “so I could spit in his eye.”

On October 29, Kenny threw a $100-a-plate dinner at the Jersey City Armory for Senator Harrison Williams, running for reelection against the Republican state chairman, Nelson Gross. Speaker after speaker laced into Lacey and the federal investigation. Congressman Gallagher called it “a Gestapo stalking through our county, an anglicized version.”

Among the Irish Catholic Democrats of Hudson County, anything anglican is suspect.

Kenny also injected a racial motif into his remarks-of a different sort. He acknowledged buying the bonds: “I never knew that when you want to take care of daughter and children that it was an offense against the U.S. government. If that displeases Lacey or that great Jewish lawyer Stern, well, that’s just too bad. I’m going to provide for the welfare of my children.”

The Newark News said that Kenny had “reached depths of personal and religious vilification.” Senator Williams had to issue a statement expressing his “deep regret” over Kenny’s language, though he doubted that Kenny had intended an anti-Semitic slur. He hailed the Little Guy as “a great humanitarian.”

Williams romped to an unexpectedly easy victory. Two days later the “great humanitarian” John V. Kenny appeared, under subpoena, before the grand jury. He was accompanied by his attorney, the late Walter D. Van Riper, who had had firsthand experience of the Byzantine intrigues of Hudson County politics. As state attorney general during World War Two, he had investigated gambling in Jersey City and had obtained several indictments. Whereupon the U.S. attorney’s office, headed by a Hague hireling, indicted Van Riper-for allegedly selling black-market gasoline. Not surprisingly, both cases lapsed into limbo.

Kenny didn’t spit in Stern’s eye-he took the Fifth Amendment . . . or tried to. He refused to sign a waiver of immunity and asked permission to read a statement. He got it-but before he could get the words out of his mouth, Stern started firing a barrage of questions: “Did you purchase those bonds?”

“Certainly I did.”

“Did you purchase them for cash?”

“Yes.”

“Through what means did you purchase them for cash?”

“What do you mean?”

“How did you buy them?”

“With cash – cash that I had saved for forty years.”

“Who handled the transaction for you?”

“Well, I’m not supposed to answer any questions….”

But he did-for eight more pages of transcript. Kenny insisted that the cash came from his private business concern, Terminal Industries, which cleaned cars on the Pennsylvania Railroad, and that his wife kept the money in a basement clothes hamper.

Finally, Kenny managed to read the statement Van Riper had prepared: “Mr. District Attorney, members of the grand jury: I am advised by my legal counsel that in view of the fact that I am the target of this investigation and that an effort is being made to bring about my indictment, if I were compelled to testify at this time, it would amount to a violation of my constitutional rights. Therefore, acting on that advice, I most respectfully decline to answer the questions asked of me in this proceeding on the ground that to do so might incriminate me.”
. . .
Read the complete article.

The sordid story of Mayor John V. Kenny and the Jersey City waterfront

Sunday, April 18th, 2010

Hudson County Corruption in the Era of John V. Kenny

The History of the Claremont Terminal and the Jersey City Waterfront since May, 1949

Author Unknown

Travelling north along Garfield Avenue in the Greenville section of Jersey City, one can see the sprawling yards of the Claremont Terminal stretching across vast acreages of land, and fanning eastward to the shallow water line of New York Bay. Less than two months ago (date of composition unknown, editor’s note), this vast terminal served as the gateway from the north, west, and south for tremendous amounts of industrial tonnage which was shipped from this point to the battlefields of Korea and the main islands of Japan. The United States Army had its headquarters here for control of overseas shipments and had entered into a contract with the Dade Brothers Corporation, a principal stevedoring concern, whose responsibility it was to crate, load and ship industrial and war cargo under Army Transport orders.

This was perhaps the most active port in the entire country. Particularly when it is considered that Jersey City serves as the home terminus for virtually all of the nation’s main railroad lines and because of this city’s proximity to the shipping empire that hugs the New York waterfront.

Industrialists the nation over shipped armaments of war to this terminal. Perishable products destined for United Nations fighting men in Korea were also received here. Guns, tanks, automotive equipment and other rolling stock were hoisted aboard transport vessels docked at this terminal and invoiced for the Far East. Some 3,000 men and women punched time cards here on an around the clock basis, eighty-six percent of which were local people, men and women who live and buy in Jersey City.

But the heartbeat of this great terminal has stopped. No longer do Army transports bulge with cargo; the vast stretches of loading platforms are now devoid of materials, and the men and women who once manned this “City of Supplies” are unemployed or searching for employment in other quarters. The life expectancy of Claremont Terminal was snapped virtually in the embryo stage resulting in a loss of some seven and one-half million dollars annually to the merchants of Jersey City.

The full responsibility for the death of this great terminal rests with one man – Mayor John V. Kenny of Jersey City.

The dictatorial characteristics that have marked Mayor Kenny’s actions since May, 1949 extended themselves in the direction of this terminal, finding their result in a wave of labor unrest that kept cargo frozen to the piers and stayed orders of the Army that this essential cargo be permitted to reach vital destinations . Wildcat strike after wildcat strike, all unofficially called by a handful of City Hall controlled dissident members of the union, rendered this terminal useless for protracted periods of time. The fight for power, and still more power over Union affairs and waterfront rackets was being waged relentlessly by the Mayor of Jersey City. Honest workingmen were caught in the squeeze.

Mayor Kenny was determined to wrest control of the unions and the waterfront from these officers who refused to bow their knee to his political mandates. He set out to accomplish this grab of power by sending handpicked members of the Marine Warehouseman’s Union (some of whom were city employees) into the terminal under express instructions to halt work and thereby force the officers of that union and the Longshoreman’s Union to make their peace with his administration. One of the Mayor’s principal purposes was to control every ounce of patronage along the waterfront.

Mayor Kenny’s hirelings played their parts well. They were responsible for acts of violence that found honest workingmen being subjected to physical abuse. They set up roadblocks which prevented trucks laden with cargo from entering the terminal. And, to maker certain that no shipments whatsoever were received, the Jersey City Police, moving under the Mayor’s orders, formed a cordon around the main entrance of the terminal halting every truck that attempted to deliver its critical war merchandise and every Longshoreman who attempted to enter. Then the union began to fight back.

In unprecedented action, many of these union officials resorted to public print in order to make their story known to the people of Jersey City. They laid the full blame for work stoppages and labor unrest at the door of Mayor Kenny. These charges were made by top officials of the Longshoreman and Warehouseman’s Union. None of these charges were ever answered. The United States Army also acted. Officials of the Army Procurement division called upon City Hall wildcat strikers to desist and allow the terminal to go back on the same footing it had once enjoyed. They threatened to move out of Jersey City unless work was resumed. Their plea was not heard at City Hall.

If peace and order was to return to Claremont Terminal, Mayor Kenny’s intervention would have to be removed. It was no secret that the Mayor had embarked upon a program of “patronage conquest,” and it was made unequivocally clear that unless his word became law, no bargain short of this would be entertained by the Mayor.

Claremont Terminal closed down.

This was a sad day for Jersey City. It brought havoc into the homes of thousands of local citizens who depended upon this income for their livelihood. It broke the backs of local merchants who no longer would enjoy the millions of dollars that these employees would spend. It shut off delivery from Jersey City of war materials to the fighting fronts. It gave notice to industrialists the world over that Jersey City, because of its unstable labor market, and its Gestapo type local government, was no place to locate their businesses. The slogan “Everything for Industry,” attributed to this city for many years, held little meaning now in the realization that a great terminal had died at the hands of unscrupulous politicians who were more intent upon bartering away the future of our city for their own self-aggrandizement and personal profit.

Why should Mayor Kenny seize upon Claremont Terminal and strangle its operations to the extent that the Army was forced to relocate in the State of Virginia? Why was the Mayor content to allow unemployment to run rampant and permit a labor situation to develop that would frighten industry?

Dade Brothers Contracting Company held a long lease with the Lehigh Valley Railroad, owners of Claremont Terminal property. The Mayor had a more than passing interest in this lease. He felt that his son-in-law, Paul Hanly, should inherit this lease and take over the terminal contract from Dade Brothers. And, by gaining control of all hiring facets at the terminal, the administration would then be in a position to further their own political salvation by sending unemployed local citizens to work through ward leaders and committeemen. This practice, it was felt, would obligate those who received this kind of help to the Kenny brand of government and would add to the wealth of the Kenny Royal Family.

But Mayor Kenny’s carefully laid plans backfired. The fighting men in Korea were far more important than the self-desires if any politicians. So the Army pulled out. They removed their operations to a territory that would allow for successful conclusion of shipment contracts. Claremont Terminal became a huge and tragic Jersey City ghost industry.

“It will not be the policy of this administration, if elected into office, to interfere in the internal affairs of any union. Grievances can be settled by union members themselves without the intrusion of public officials.”

These were the words of Mayor Kenny, spoken during the running of the City Commission elections preceding May, 1949. But this interference did come, and it came in the most brutal manner from the same man who uttered these high sounding phrases when he was running for the highest offices in Jersey City’s government. This interference has resulted in a loss of employment to possibly three thousand able bodied men and women. It has robbed almost seven and one-half million dollars annually from local merchants.

Claremont Terminal is dead. Mayor Kenny was its assassin.

Power, if ruthlessly displayed can result only in ruin. The Claremont Terminal, now rendered to ashes, is a case in point that none can ignore except at their peril.

The closing of Claremont Terminal is by no means an isolated example of the cruel sabotage practiced by Mayor Kenny on the labor movement along the Jersey City Waterfront. The terminal closing proves the rule rather than the exception.

Actually the closing down of this vast terminal was the expected climax of a series of waterfront disturbances that have consistently plagued steamship companies who berth here. The resultant work stoppages have brought about financial disaster to those men who must look to waterfront operations as their sole means of income and has seriously crippled Jersey City as a profitable place to conduct waterfront commerce.

History will record the fact that the peace and order that prevailed along the Jersey City waterfront for many, many years, suddenly and violently changed into a state of violent chaos after John V. Kenny was sworn in as Mayor of the second largest city in New Jersey.

As a matter of record, the entire Hudson Coutny waterfront was completely paralyzed in July, 1949, denying work to thousands of able-bodied men. Perishable and expensive cargo was left to rot on the piers. This particular strike, in no way conccerned with hours, wages, or working conditions, extended over a period of seven logn weeks before loading operations were resumed. Neither the officials of the union or the steamship companies themselves were rewponsible for this wildcat walkout. The fault rested squarely with Mayor Kenny who, having gained control of city government, was now following a planned pattern of pitting union against union, employee against employee, in a brazend attempt to control the division of spoils that is synonymous commerce under his administration.

No sooner was the prolonged strike over when the flame of violence and disorderflared anew less than three weeks later. Again, vital cargo was left standing for weeks on the piers. Coming on top of the previous seven week layoff, the financial blow proved much too severe to many families who were forced to go on city relief rolls in order to buy food and pay their rent. These were the bitter fruits of Kenny “Freedom.”

Then came the staged march on City Hall. Men who had been denied employment fell easy prey to the Mayor’s scheme to embarrass his fellow Commissioner, the late James F. Murray, and thereby shift the blam from his own office.

Some four hundred longshoremen, led by “Biffo” DeLorenzo (a Kenny favorite and brother-in-law of the slain mobster Charles Yanowsky, who had been Kenny’s close friend) converged on City Hall in an unruly demonstration. Mayor Kenny knew their purpose. So did DeLorenzo. So too did Commissioner Murray, who only too well realized that Mayor Kenny’s claws were now reaching out for Pier B, the only city-owned pier on the Hudson River. DeLorenzo, backed by a mob of four hundred longshoremen demanded that Murray give a long-term lease on Pier B, which was under his jurisdiction, to the McGrath Stevedoring
. . .
such power only comes after families are hurt, men are left unemployed, and bombs explode.

Claremont Terminal is but one lesson. The entire history of the Jersey City waterfront under Mayor Kenny is a sordid story of major proportions.

Lou Manzo ran five times for Mayor of Jersey City.

Friday, April 16th, 2010

The Lou Manzo follies

The first trip on the merry-go-round was in the ’92 special election held after Gerry McCann got the gong from Michael Chertoff. With the Hudson County Democratic Organization’s backing, Lou appeared poised to win. But, as luck would have it, Lou’s brother Allen decided to place his name on the ballot, too. Jersey City voters got the chance to view Smothers Brothersesque campaign commercials with Momma Manzo affirming that she liked Lou best. There was no brass ring for Lou.

In the 1993 regular election for Mayor of Jersey City, Lou Manzo was again the HCDO candidate. This time, brother Allen did not run. A bizarre theme of the Manzo campaign was to blame Bret Schundler for Apartheid in South Africa. Though Lou seemed to have missed it, the voters knew that Apartheid was abolished some years before the election. At least one audience walked out on him.

Losing by a two to one margin, Lou Manzo said that he felt like he’d been “hit by a refrigerator.”

Manzo ran again in 2001 in a three way race with Glenn Cunningham and Tom Degise. Knocked out in the first round, Manzo backed Glenn Cunningham in the run-off. An early City Hall meeting between Lou and the newly-elected Mayor didn’t turn out so well. Manzo complained that he’d been kept waiting in the reception area. As the weeks wore one, the lumps got kneaded out. Lou Manzo ran (and won) for Assembly in the 31st on the Cunningham reform ticket.

After the death of Glenn Cunningham, it was deja vu all over again with Manzo in the 2004 special election. That spectacle dwarfed anything that had been seen in Jersey City for generations. This time ’round, another brother, Ron, managed to cause trouble. Ron Manzo pleaded guilty to insider trading, involving McGreevey’s Chief-of-Staff. The Cunningham supporters backed Willy Flood and called Lou Manzo a “political charlatan and backstabber.” Lou Manzo wasted time and energy ousting Ron Buonocore from the race. And in yet another sideshow, a convicted sex offender accused another candidate of ordering a hit on Manzo.

Manzo managed to spend over two million dollars, plastering the town with signs — including huge picture banners strangely reminiscent of Citizen Kane — and filling mailboxes with gibberish printed in three colors on glossy paper. But, despite the extraneous motion spending spree, the Manzo campaign never developed a clear, coherent message. Plus, Manzo had no Get Out The Vote, the spearhead of Hudson County ground war politics (and the raison d’être of Machine politics). Manzo lost this time, too.

And that’s not all.

Post-election, Eyewitness News featured Frmr. Candidate Manzo for stiffing campaign workers.

Charged with taking bribes from Solomon Dwek in connection with the 2009 run for mayor, the curtain seems to have finally closed on the Manzo Follies.


LOUser Manzo Malarkey


From the Assemblyman Manzo Web Site:
Manzo was not afraid to take on powerful political figures and big developers. In the mid 1980′s, Manzo halted construction at the site of one of New Jersey’s largest developments, Newport, on the Jersey City waterfront. He challenged the world-renowned developer, Samuel LeFrak, when he discovered that the development was dumping contaminated soil on the site and into the Hudson River. Furthermore, Manzo shutdown portions of the Newport Mall when it became infested with rodents because of the developer’s failure to properly bait excavation sites.
. . .
In 1989 when a pro-development candidate was elected Jersey City’s Mayor, Manzo locked horns with politicians overattempts to stifle his Division’s efforts to have chromium sites excavated. The Mayor felt that Manzo’s efforts were scaring away potential developers from the city. Manzo was forced out of office and pursued a lengthy, unsuccessful battle in the courts to retain his job.

In 1990, Manzo became the first independent in Hudson County history to win election to the Hudson county Board of Freeholders, defeating the hand-picked candidate of the very Mayor who forced him out of his Health Division post.
# # #
Manzo’s “raids” on Newport were his version of “Oh WAITER, there’s a FLY in my soup!” For LOUnatic Manzo, being Health Officer meant one cheap publicity stunt after another, the public be damned.

That supposedly evil tool of developers Jersey City Mayor who “Manzo locked horns with” was Gerry McCann, Lou Manzo’s biggest backer.


The Lou Manzo follies

Hudson County Congressman Cornelius Gallagher, Jersey City Mayor Thomas Whelan, Council President Thomas Flaherty and the millions in bonds and cash

Thursday, April 8th, 2010

Congressman Cornelius Gallagher of Bayonne
In appearance silver-haired, ruddily handsome Congressman Cornelius E. Gallagher is the image of a dedicated public servant.

Originally appeared in Tiger In The Court
Memoirs of Hudson County

By Paul Hoffman

A lot of legwork was required to discover where the money wound up. One lead came from an unrelated inquiry. Internal Revenue had been investigating Congressman Cornelius Gallagher, who had purchased more than $948,000 worth of municipal bonds – for cash! “If you’re going to charge a man with tax evasion,” Stern says, “you have to prove that he’s not just a conduit for funds, but that he’s buying the bonds for himself. The only way you can do that is to find out who’s clipping the coupons.

“When you have a bearer bond, it’s not registered in anyone’s name – that’s what the phrase bearer bond means. It’s like money. Anyone can clip the coupons, walk into a bank, fill out a form and submit them for payment. And he can do it in any bank in the United States. Obviously, the IRS can’t run to every bank in the country to find out who’s cashing coupons.

“IRS did a fantastic job. They went back to the issuing municipalities to see where the coupons had come from, then checked back to determine who had cashed them. It turned out that something like four hundred thousand dollars of the bonds Gallagher had bought were in a Florida bank account and being clipped by the bank.”

So the IRS agents checked at the First National Bank of Miami Beach and discovered that the bonds had been deposited-not by Gallagher, but by Jersey City’s mayor, Thomas Whelan, and council president Thomas Flaherty. The two Jersey City officials maintained joint numbered accounts that, at their peak, had deposits of $1,232,433.30 – all in cash or in negotiable bonds purchased for cash.

A second cache of bonds was uncovered-and recovered-when IRS agents started checking the bank and brokerage records of William A. Sternkopf, Jr., the former Hudson County auditor who had gone on under Kenny’s patronage to commissionerships first on the New Jersey Turnpike Authority, then on the bistate Port of New York Authority, which operates the metropolitan area’s docks, bridges, tunnels and airports.

On one of Sternkopf’s bond purchases, the records at Lehman Brothers, the giant Wall Street investment house, carried the notation that the bonds had been bought for John V. Kenny. Tracing the trail of the transaction, the IRS agents discovered that Kenny had bought $700,000 in bonds through Sternkopf – all for cash, delivered to the bank by the Hudson County police chief, Fred J. Kropke.

Through a tip from a still-undisclosed informant, the U.S. attorney’s office learned that $300,000 of the bonds were stashed in the suite of Pollak Hospital administrator Paul Hanly, Kenny’s son-in-law, and the remaining $400,000 at the Jersey Shore home of his granddaughter, Margo Hanly Hermann. Both were haled before the grand jury.

Hanly took the Fifth Amendment, escaping ouster by resigning – only to have Kenny name his son, John, as his successor. Mrs. Hermann, after invoking the Fifth Amendment, was given immunity and she told where the bonds were. They were subpoenaed as evidence. Lacey said they represented “plunder unmatched by anything in my experience. You’d have to go back to the days of Boss Tweed.”

Next

Guy Catrillo meets Miss Universe.

Tuesday, March 16th, 2010


Guy Catrillo was ‘mongst the many arrested in the Dwek stings.

Jimmy King’s Jersey City Parking Authority

Wednesday, March 10th, 2010


May 14, 2003
Pat O’Melia’s Statement to the City Council of Jersey City Concerning the Parking Authority


. . .


MR. BYRNE: Patrol O’Melia, you
are our keynote speaker. You get five minutes
or less.


MR. O’MELIA: I will do it in
less, Robert.


MR. BYRNE: Okay. Sir.

MR. O’MELIA: Hello. My name is
Pat O’Melia. I reside at 130 Congress Street in
Jersey City. I am the public relations person
for the Jersey City Parking Authority. I come
before this Council today asking for a complete
investigation of the Parking Authority. And
now, if you want to ask me some questions as to
why, I will be happy to answer them; but I will
tell you right off the bat this is an
organization that is out of control. It is run
by intimidation and thuggery, for that matter.


Yesterday a 28-year employee of
Parking Authority, the deputy director, was
threatened with termination. There is no
conversation. There is no medium that you can
express your opinions at the Parking Authority
without it becoming confrontational and your
jobs are threatened. This goes from the
management right down to the PEOs who write the
tickets. If you contact the union, you will
find out complaints have been made there.


The morale at the Parking
Authority is the pits. And these are the same
people I put out on the streets with a ticket
book. We got to change the morale. And public
relations starts from the inside out, and it’s
going to have to start at the top.

I have spoken to the Mayor about
this. He is not interested in hearing this. So
I come before yous. I have just spoken to the
Mayor just prior to arriving here. I wanted to
tell him face-to-face that I was coming before
the Council. I will say he didn’t take that
well. But I am asking you to investigate the
Jersey City Parking Authority.


MR. SMITH: Alex.


MR. O’MELIA: Now, you people have
known me for three years with my other role as
the radio show; and you know I am a straight
shooter. I don’t screw around. We have been on
different end of the arguments sometimes, but
you know I don’t kid around. This is serious.
There is a tremendous problem at the Parking
Authority.


MR. MALDONADO: Can you highlight
some of these problems?


MR. O’MELIA: Intimidation is a
big deal there now with the new director.
Joining associations has become a big deal.
Purchasing tickets to events; whether you want
to go or not, you are going to buy a ticket.
Ticket quotas — believe me. we got to write a
certain amount of tickets. Don’t come back if
you don’t. If we don’t go forward with this
investigation — and we can leave the
individuals held harmless without —


MR. MALDONADO: Immunity?


MR. O’MELIA: You got it. You are
going — you are going to get a lot of
interesting stories, believe me. You don’t have
to have a rain coat and be Columbo to crack this
case.

MR. SMITH: Alex, would you —
would you — you and Carlton need to deal with
these allegations, particularly in regards to –
these are some serious allegations on the record
that we need to address.


Also, it brings me to mind,

Peter, in your ward I need to ask you about
between Stegman and Bergen Avenue. Bergen and
the Boulevard. Is that no parking for — from
three to nine for anyone, or is it two-hour
limit?


MR. BRENNAN: That is not zoned
parking there.

MR. SMITH: Huh?


MR. BRENNAN: That is not zoned
parking.


MR. SMITH: According to what I’m
told — I stopped and talked to Parking
Authority official who was booting cars, an
officer. He said that their hours there are
from — there is no parking except for
residents.


MR. BRENNAN: East of the
Boulevard you are talking?


MR. SMITH: Yes.


MR. BRENNAN: No, it’s west of the
Boulevard.


MS. RICHARDSON: Would have to be
posted, anyway.


MR. SMITH It was not posted; I
brought that point up. Alex, that is an issue think that needs to be addressed with the
Parking Authority. I was in this area last —
the beginning of the week. It was brought to my
attention. People were being booted, and there
was no sign posted. I was told by the — told
by the Parking Authority officer that this is
between Bergen Avenue and the Boulevard.


MR. MALDONADO: There is no
residential parking there?


MR. BRENNAN: No, it’s west of the
Boulevard. It’s from —


MR. SMITH: And I told them I
didn’t think the ordinance was in effect for
that area. So we need to clearly define what
that — what is happening there because we may
have illegally booted and fined people who were
parked there.


MR. BOOTH: Stegman Street?


MR. SMITH: Stegman — Stegman
Street between Bergen and the Boulevard. Is it
Stegman Parkway or Stegman Street?
22


MR. BRENNAN: Stegman Parkway.


MR. HEALY: Stegman Parkway is
west of the Boulevard.


MR. SMITH: Stegman Street, as

well as Culver Avenue between the Boulevard
and — between the Boulevard and Bergen Avenue.


MR. HEALY: Boulevard and
Westside.


MR. SMITH: Okay. It’s not
Culver: it’s Audubon. I’m sorry, Audubon.
Audubon Avenue.


MR. LIPSKI: Pat, have you ever
been the recipient of any of this intimidation
or coercion?


MR. McGEE: (This seems to be an error in the transcript. It appears to actually be Pat O’Melia speaking.) Oh, sure, but I am a
big boy: I can handle myself. There are
situations between me and the director, but that
I’m handling on my own. And for that matter, I
have just retained an attorney. But that is —
that I will take care of myself.


But this all came to a head
yesterday with the situation with the deputy
director. And this has just got to end. Today
I had a meeting with commissioners from the
Jersey City Parking Authority expressing the
same concerns as to an agency gone out of
control.


MR. HEALY: The commissioners
expressed that concern to you?

MR. O’MELIA: Yes, they did, at a
secret location called Vinnie’s Pizzeria on
Kennedy Boulevard today. But — I don’t know
why they picked that spot, but that’s where we
went. The Parking Authority meeting — I
haven’t attended any of the meetings in a while.
They now go about eight minutes. Somehow, some
way the contract is signed by the director,
supersedes the commissioners; they are no longer
required to vote on anything. The
commissioner —


MR. SMITH: That is not true.


MR. O’MELIA: — has the power to
hire and fire.


MR. MALDONADO: Pat, what they do
is they vote on the consent agenda. So what
they do is they take whatever amount of items on
the agenda, whether it’s five or ten or 20, they
condense them to one vote; and they get through
the agenda rather quickly.


MR. O’MELIA: Junior, I think you
ought to talk to some of the commissioners,
then.


MR. SMITH: I don’t know if they
can legally do that. I don’t know if they can

legally do that.


MR. O’MELIA: For that matter —


MR. SMITH: You Sunshine a meeting
and you Sunshine the items in that meeting. We
need to —


MR. LIPSKI: Orders the —

MR. MALDONADO: They don’t have
the ability to hire and fire without board
approval.


MR. O’MELIA: You got it.


MR. MALDONADO: That’s one of the
reasons I had earlier, before you got here,
requested for records in terms of what the employment status or how many employees have
been hired in the City and all the autonomous
agencies and authorities within the City.


MR. O’MELIA: I can’t speak for
the other agencies, but I believe there is going
to be some interesting reading at the Parking
Authority.


MR. BYRNE: Okay. Thanks, Pat.


MR. O’MELIA: Is that it?


MR. BYRNE: I think so.


MR. VEGA: I just wanted to ask
our Corporation Counsel, would we be able to add
to our resolution that gives the municipality
investigatory powers to include the Parking
Authority as part of our purview and our
jurisdiction?


MR. BOOTH: You can declare
yourself an investigatory body for any purpose
connected with the City government. You can do
that. I don’t see any reason why we couldn’t
amend the resolution that you have for tonight
to include the Parking Authority or do a
separate one at another time. But if you want
to amend tonight’s, let’s do that.


MR. VEGA: I think it’s
appropriate for the severity of the allegations
that we amend this and schedule these
investigations at the appropriate time. They
don’t have to be scheduled for the 28th. But
they could be scheduled at a later date which
these allegations that — that are being made
can be tested, in fact, if there is any truth to
them.


MR. BOOTH: If we are not going to do anything before the 28th, which we are
probably not, it might be a good idea to hold
off and do a separate resolution.

AUDIENCE MEMBER: Talk into the
microphone, please. microphone.


MR. BYRNE: In the microphone.


MR. BOOTH: I could — I could —


MR. BYRNE: They need to hear you
in Harrison.


AUDIENCE MEMBER: Microphone.


MR. BOOTH: I could — I could
interview Mr. O’Melia maybe and find out a few
more specifics and prepare a resolution for your
consideration at the next meeting.


MR. VEGA: I would appreciate it,
if you did that.


MS. RICHARDSON: I have a question
for you. Alex. Do you need a resolution to vote
subpoena powers by this body?


MR. BOOTH: What you need to do is
to form a — a — to form yourselves as a
committee of the whole for purpose of conducting
an investigation. Then, as a — as a body under
that auspices you do have subpoena powers. If
you form an ad hoc committee, as opposed to a
committee of the whole, then, in my opinion,
it’s questionable whether you would have
2subpoena powers or not, and I would say that you
didn’t. So you have to form yourself as a
committee of the whole. Then you require
subpoena powers for City business.


MR. SMITH: Alex, I think it would
be hard for us to exclude anybody in matters
like this, so a committee where all of us would
be able to ask questions is a — an appropriate
action.


MR. BOOTH: I think that’s why the
legislation was designed that way. Subpoena
powers, it’s a very serious matter and really
shouldn’t — it’s better to conduct it with all
of you, rather than some of you. And you can —
you can have an ad hoc committee of a few of you
and with that you can — you can ask people to
come in and talk. But if they don’t come, you
don’t have the power to go to court and have
them held in contempt or — whereas, under
tonight’s resolution, as a committee of the
whole you have subpoena power. If people don’t
comply with the subpoenas, you go to court, hold
them in contempt: and judge takes care of
business.

. . .

Managing a Jersey City Bar in the late Sixties

Monday, February 22nd, 2010

Early one hot and humid morning in the late sixties, Sal, a Downtown barkeep, drove up to his establishment. From a block away, he could hear the clanging burglar alarm. As he got out of the car, he spotted the fragments of broken glass on the sidewalk. Opening the door, even before he took the key out of the lock, it was obvious that the change drawer was gone out of the cash register. With a sinking feeling building in his stomach, Sal put one hand on the bar and jumped to the other side. Someone had taken a couple of dozen cases of liquor that were stocked in back room, well over a thousand dollars worth.

How did they get all the boxes out through the small space of the narrow broken window? Only one case at a time would fit through there, and only sideways at that. It would take at least two people — and more likely three or four. They’d have to put the cases on top of the bar. Then they’d have to hand them out the broken window. From there, they probably put the stuff in a car. If whoever did it had carried it all away, they must be no more than just down the block or around the corner.

Sal flipped a switch, resetting the alarm, putting an end to the metallic ringing noise. And the alarm was going off the whole time. The police never showed up? Nobody saw what was happening?

Pete, an affable loser who lived across the street, shuffled into the tavern. As Pete’s wife was collecting welfare on the claim that he had abandoned her, Pete could not be found at home between the weekday hours of 8AM and 4PM. That was when the welfare inspectors worked. To play it safe, Pete generally started hanging out in the bar an hour early and stayed an hour late. The regular customers derived great amusement watching as a welfare inspector with a clipboard rang the bell to Pete’s wife’s apartment in order to verify that Pete was still among the missing.

“Sal, I don’t know how much it’s gonna help, but I saw the whole thing.”

“Didja, recognise who did it?”

“Nah, but I can tell ya’ what happened. I was looking out the window. It was late, so I had the lights off. I was listenin’ to the game on the radio from out on the West Coast, but I had the sound down real low. Some hophead threw a rock through the window, jumped in and popped right out with the change drawer. He took off like a bat outta hell.”

“But what happened to all the scotch and whiskey?”

“That’s what I’m about to tell ya’. As I’m seein’ the guy disappear down the block, I’m tryin’ to figger out what to do, as we got no phone in the apartment. It bein’ so late, I didn’t know right off who to wake up to ask to use to use the phone to call the cops or if I should walk-like to a phone booth. Just then a cop car pulls up. He pokes his head inside for little bit and then goes back to the car and gets on the radio. Real fast, another car pulls up with two more cops. Two of them then climb in the window and start passing out cases to the guy outside who puts ‘em in the cop cars. They made two trips.”

“Pete, why din’ch’a do somethin’?”

“What was I gonna do, Sal? Call the cops? I couldn’t say nothin’, the wife on welfare and all that.”

“Yeah, you’re right. There was nothin’ ya’ could do.”

Pete handed Sal a sheet of paper, “Well, it isn’t like I didn’t do nothin’. I got the numbers and the plates of the cars.”

- – -

In the Jersey City of this era, it was “customary” for each tavern owner to give the captain of the local police precinct one thousand five hundred dollars in cash once a year, just before Christmas. In the strict sense, this was not a payoff, as the sum did not buy any relaxed vigilance from the police; that cost more. The fifteen hundred was a under-the-table cash licensing fee over and above that paid by check each year to City Hall. It was assumed by one and all that the money did not stop with the precinct captain — that most of the cash swam upstream to the mayor’s office and beyond. Everybody knew better than to ask any questions about that. And what if you didn’t pay? Innumerable Byzantine laws regulated running a bar in Jersey City. Going strictly by the book, the police could shut down a church social in a minute if they wanted to.

- – -

Six months after the burglary, snow had replaced the mosquitoes. There was a pretty good crowd in the bar and a Bing Crosby Christmas song played on the juke box. Red was tending bar. Sal was watching TV. The door opened and the Precinct Captain made his way through the swirly, smokey air to where Sal was sitting.

“Hey, Captain McCulligan! Good to see ya’!”

Sal got up and walked around the bar to pour the police officer a drink.

“Still Chivas?”

Sal chatted on about the weather, old timers who had died, local kids serving in Viet Nam. The Precinct Captain was beginning to become perplexed.

“Isn’t there something that you’d like to talk to me about? In private?”

“Like what?”

Captain McCulligan, turning red with rage, walked right up to Sal and spoke in a low voice, “Follow me to the shithouse. NOW!”

Some poor drunk was trying to shave in the bathroom. Seeing the bar owner and the police officer, the guy hustled out without even wiping off the shaving cream that still covered one side of his face.

“Alright. I don’t know what kind of game ye’r playin’. Alls I wants to know is do you have the fifteen hunnerd, or what?”

“Ways I sees it, we’re even.”

Captain McCulligan actually began to shake, “What’s that supposed to mean?”

“Some of your boys stopped by last June. Had quite a party. Cleaned me out. Here’s the numbers of the cars.”

McCullingan took the paper, scrutinized it for a moment, and then stomped out.

- – -

A few days later, first thing in the morning, Sal was counting out some singles to put in the cash register. The door opened. Captain McCulligan stood there, but didn’t walk inside.

“I just wanted to tell you that I’m sorry about what happened. You’re right. We’re even this year.”

Sal wondered if the patrolmen responsible for the burglary had to pay the the fifteen hundred dollars. But he knew better than to ask any questions about that.

Mayor Whelan and the Jersey City Gambit

Saturday, February 13th, 2010

Gene Scanlon knew Jersey City politics. He once was the political reporter for the Jersey Journal. He had worked as an aide to Mayor Thomas Gangemi – at any rate, until the Feds got wind of the fact that Gangemi wasn’t a citizen.

It was the late 60s; now Whelan was Mayor of Jersey City. Gene Scanlon held no illusions concerning Whelan’s ethics, or absence of the same. Everybody knew that Whelan served on behalf of Hudson County Boss John V. Kenny. As a reporter, Scanlon had written of Kenny’s crooked deals. But even as sophisticated an observer as Gene was in for a surprise. He was soon to learn of the massive spread of corruption’s cancerous growth.

Scanlon was proud of his Irish heritage. Gene was the founder of Jersey City’s St. Patrick’s Day Parade and every few years organized a group trip to Ireland.

Several elderly priests (who had come from Ireland many years before) dearly wished to join the tour, but never were able to afford it. These priests long had tended their parishes in a manner approaching sainthood. Gene Scanlon had a premonition that if the priests did not see Ireland this time around, there never would be another opportunity for them.

But how to get the money?

A brilliant thought came to Gene. In the upside down morality of Jersey City, where on every street corner some gambler had a shop (as long as the appropriate blessing went to the local precinct), churches were not allowed to provide “games of chance” at carnivals. To stretch the situation to the surreal, it actually was not against the law for charities to organize these activities. The technicality was that a permit was required; the municipality would accept the application, but never issue the permit. If City Hall might make an exception in just this one instance, a circumstance and a cause that nobody would criticize, the parishes could easily raise the funds!

Gene Scanlon requested a personal appointment with Mayor Whelan. Gene extolled the many virtues of the clergymen, proving many times over that they well deserved to be the first cases of declared saints before death. Scanlon shared his foreboding that this would be the last chance for the elderly priests to see the land of their birth. Gene explained how the men had practiced the vow of poverty by devoting their lives to the poor of Jersey City.

At this point Gene Scanlon paused and looked up at Mayor Whelan. Gene had each move figured out like in a game of chess. He expected Whelan to ask what he could do. Then Gene’s brainstorm move of the carney permits might appear on the board.

Even though Whelan might be a master at a game or two, Gene now would discover that it wasn’t chess that the Mayor played.

“Well Gene, how much money are we talking about here?”

For a moment Gene was speachless – which indicated a shock the extent of which would have landed an ordinary man in the hospital. Scanlon was wondering why Whelan wanted to know the cost of the trip, but he kept that to himself.

“Mayor, I think that a thousand dollars would cover it.”

Mayor Whelan reached down and pulled open one of his desk’s deep drawers. It was filled with many stacks of one hundred dollar bills. The mayor took a pair of the bundles out from the pile. For a few seconds, Whelan fanned through and scrutinized each of the collections of bills, seemingly verifying the denominations and the count.

Handing the cash over to Gene Scanlon, Mayor Whelan said, “Here’s two. . . I wouldn’t want them running short over there.”

Hudson County Freeholder Braker demands dollars and viagra from Dr. Sandoval.

Saturday, January 30th, 2010

On December 11, 2002, the Feds arrested Bill Braker, former Jersey City police officer, Freeholder and Deputy Police Director. William Braker was on tape telling Oscar Sandoval, a physician — and a Federal informant — that an “investment” of “cash and viagra” had the guaranteed return of a Hudson County contract.